Hedonic preferences, symmetric loss aversion and the willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap by Fosgerau, Mogens
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Hedonic preferences, symmetric loss
aversion and the willingness to
pay-willingness to accept gap
Mogens Fosgerau
Technical University of Denmark, University of Antwerp
2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10041/
MPRA Paper No. 10041, posted 15. August 2008 00:00 UTC
Hedonic preferences, symmetric loss aversion
and the willingness to pay-willingness to accept
gap
Mogens Fosgerau ∗ Bruno De Borger †
April 14, 2008
Abstract
The results in this paper are relevant for the application of valuation studies
in cost-benefit analysis in the presence of the willingness to pay - willingness to
accept gap. We consider a consumer who makes choices based on choice prefer-
ences exhibiting reference-dependence and loss aversion. Choice preferences are
related to underlying hedonic preferences through the marginal rates of substitu-
tion (MRS) at the reference. Our issue is the identification of hedonic preferences
relevant to welfare economic analysis. We show that the hedonic MRS is identi-
fied from reference-dependent choices if loss aversion exhibits a certain symmetry.
Moreover, we show that this symmetry is rational in the sense that it leads to max-
imal expected hedonic utility when choices are made under reference-dependent
choice preferences.
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1 Introduction
A large literature has developed on the valuation of non-market goods in a variety of
sectors, including health, transportation, environmental amenities, marketing, etc. A
remarkably consistent finding is the large gap between measures of willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) in such valuation studies. Horowitz and Mc-
Connell (2003) review more than 200 valuation studies and find the mean of the ratio
(WTA/WTP) to exceed 7. The size of this difference is hard to rationalize within a
standard Hicksian framework and economists and psychologists have looked for al-
ternative explanations. The theory of reference-dependent preferences (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) has been shown to provide an ap-
pealing and economically convincing explanation of the WTP/WTA gap. Their initial
specification of reference-dependent preferences, often used in later work (Stott, 2006),
is based on reference-dependent utility functions that are additively separable in value
functions; the latter incorporate loss aversion. Reference-dependence implies that the
slope of an indifference curve depends on the reference from which it is evaluated, and
that kinks occur at the reference point. Loss aversion further implies that losses cause
a greater loss of utility than same size gains. Within this framework, Bateman et al.
(1997) theoretically show that WTA must necessarily exceed WTP, and they provide
experimental evidence for the magnitude of the effect. Based on a large survey study-
ing people’s valuation of time, De Borger and Fosgerau (2008) confirm the power of
reference-dependence in explaining differences in valuation measures.
As the original theory implies a drastic deviation from conventional consumer the-
ory, Munro and Sugden (2003) have recently reformulated reference-dependent prefer-
ences in a way that is more closely related to standard theories of consumer behavior.
They abandon the additivity assumption and allow for endogenous reference points.
They consider a process of maximizing reference-dependent preferences in a series of
trades, each time updating the reference, and they show that, under some mild con-
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ditions, the process converges to the set of ’reflexive’ optima. A reflexively optimal
bundle is defined for a given budget and prices such that, were the person endowed
with this bundle, he would not want to consider any further trade.
Even if the various theories of reference-dependence have resolved the issue of
large estimated differences between different valuation measures, they have raised
another important question, namely how to obtain valuation measures that can be
used in applied cost-benefit analysis? How to use the behavioral model of reference-
dependence in a normative cost-benefit evaluation? In a more general setting, this
relation between behavioral economic models and normative welfare economic mod-
els is a main focus of the recent literature on behavioral welfare economics (for a recent
survey, see Bernheim and Rangel, 2007). Different views have been defended. Some
authors argue (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004) that, in case certain ”anoma-
lies” are observed, the best answer is to expand the preference domain to explain the
observed behavior, and use the adapted behavioral model as the basis for a normative
policy evaluation. Another school of thought suggests that, if choices cannot be ex-
plained by a set of coherent preferences or if people are observed to make systematic
mistakes, it may be necessary to abandon the close relation between behavioral and
normative economic models.1
In this paper, we study the question how to use the behavioral model of reference-
dependence as the basis for obtaining valuation measures that are relevant for nor-
mative welfare economic evaluation such as cost-benefit analysis. It has been argued
(e.g., Munro and Sugden, 2003; Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2006) that the reference may adapt
quickly to new circumstances. In that case, it clearly seems inappropriate to use wel-
fare measures for evaluation that have been directly obtained from reference-dependent
preferences. We therefore take a different route and focus on recovering underlying he-
donic reference-free preferences from estimates based on reference-dependent choice
preference models, taking valuations pertaining to hedonic preferences as being those
1See Bernheim and Rangel (2007) for this discussion.
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relevant for welfare economic evaluation. We follow Munro and Sugden (2003), Bern-
heim and Rangel (2007) and Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) in explicitly linking choice
preferences and reference-free hedonic preferences.2 Moreover, we allow for endoge-
nous reference points and adaptation of the reference in a series of trades. We do
so, however, within the framework of the typical ’kinked at the reference’-value func-
tions suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1991). If choice preferences are reference-
dependent in the sense just described, we then ask whether estimates of WTP and
WTA provide information on the underlying reference-free hedonic trade-offs between
goods. If choice preferences are reference-dependent, are estimates of people’s WTP or
WTA directly useful at all in a normative welfare economic setting such as cost-benefit
analysis? This paper makes some progress in answering this question.
For the particular class of reference-dependent preferences considered, we obtain
two important results. First, we show that imposing symmetric loss aversion (i.e., gains
are underweighted by consumers by as much as losses are overweighted relative to the
marginal hedonic utilities) allows us to recover the hedonic reference-free trade-off be-
tween goods from estimates of WTP and WTA. More specifically, we find that neither
WTA nor WTP is an acceptable measure of the hedonic trade-off, but they do contain
all necessary information to calculate the underlying hedonic valuation. This finding
has important implications for cost-benefit analysis with reference-dependent prefer-
ences. Second, motivated by the importance of symmetric loss aversion for identifica-
tion of the underlying reference-free trade-offs, we show that there are good economic
reasons to justify imposing symmetry. We find that, within the Munro-Sugden (and
others) philosophy of linking choice and hedonic preferences, a sufficient condition
for the hedonic optimum to be a reflexive optimum is that the value functions exhibit
symmetric loss aversion. This offers support for imposing symmetric loss aversion
on Tversky-Kahnemann-type of value functions: if a series of reference-dependent
2This line of attack is also advocated by Beshears et al. (2007). See also Kahneman and Sugden (2005)
on the distinction between hedonic and choice preferences.
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choices are to converge to a point near the reference-free hedonic optimum, then the
reference-free optimum must be a reflexive optimum, and symmetry is a sufficient
condition for this to be the case. This result is especially relevant in view of recent ex-
perimental findings. Indeed, it has been argued (see, e.g., List, 2004; Plott and Zeiler,
2005) that the gap between WTP and WTA strongly declines when people gain more
experience with the type of choices to be made (due to training, increasing familiarity
with the choice environment, etc). This experimental evidence is consistent with our
model only under symmetric loss aversion.
Finally, we show that symmetric loss aversion can be considered rational in a
broader sense. We show that, if choice preferences are not symmetric, then a process of
sequential choice utility maximization will lead to lower expected hedonic utility than
would be the case under symmetry. Using a rationality argument like this to close a
model is, of course, a fundamental strategy in economics. The novelty here is the setup
where closure is obtained in a model that links hedonic and choice preferences.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we present the model of
reference-dependence that will be used, and we define the different valuation measures
considered. In Section 3 we show that symmetric loss aversion allows identification
of underlying hedonic trade-offs between goods on the basis of reference-dependent
choice preferences, and the implications for cost benefit analysis are briefly discussed.
Section 4 studies the rationality of symmetric loss aversion. A final section 5 concludes.
2 Reference-dependence and four valuation measures
We make minimal assumptions with respect to an individual’s preferences. Consider a
reference-dependent choice utility function defined over two goods; one of these may
be money and the other may be a non-market good. Denote the reference-dependent
choice utility function by u(x|r), where x is the bundle under evaluation and r is the
reference. Choice utility may have a kink at the reference. We therefore allow the
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left and right derivatives of u(x|r) to be different, using the notation u+i (x|r) for a
partial derivative from the right and u−i (x|r) for a partial derivative from the left. Note
that loss aversion is just equivalent to u+i = u
+
i (r|r) < u−i (r|r) = u−i . We also
use the notation that x+ = x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise, while x− = −x if x < 0
and 0 otherwise. Consider then small changes x from the reference and differentiate
u(x+ r|r) to obtain a linear approximation to utility at the reference
u(x+ r|r) ' u(r|r) + u+1 (r|r)x+1 − u−1 (r|r)x−1 + u+2 (r|r)x+2 − u−2 (r|r)x−2 . (1)
Now consider the four standard trade-offs used in economic valuation studies, given
reference-dependence (Bateman et al., 1997). Define the willingness-to-pay (WTP) as
how much the individual is willing to pay in terms of x1 for a marginal increase in
x2, relative to the reference. Similarly, the willingness-to-accept (WTA) measures how
much extra of x1 would compensate for a marginal reduction (relative to the reference)
in x2. The equivalent gain (EG) measures indifference at the reference between receiv-
ing an increase in x1 or in x2. The equivalent loss (EL) is the corresponding measure
for losses. Using (1), it is easy to show that the four valuation measures are given by:
WTP =
u+2
u−1
, WTA =
u−2
u+1
EG =
u+2
u+1
, EL =
u−2
u−1
In general, these will all be different. Observe that
WTP ·WTA = EG · EL. (2)
This equality follows just because reference-dependent utility is linear for small changes.
If measurements of WTP,WTA, EG and EL are made in some experiment and subjects’
choices are generated from maximisation of possibly reference-dependent utility, then
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(2) will hold. This is true regardless of the properties of the utility function, as long
as it has derivatives from the left and the right in each variable. What matters is that
there is a function that generates choices. Empirical evidence in De Borger and Fos-
gerau (2008) shows that (2) holds with great precision in a large survey dataset from a
discrete choice experiment designed to measure these four valuations simultaneously.
This evidence then indicates that people in fact do make choices in a way that is con-
sistent with them maximizing a function.3
Since loss aversion in this setting is equivalent to u+i < u
−
i , it can easily be shown
that loss aversion implies the following relationship between the four valuation mea-
sures: WTP < EG,EL < WTA (Bateman et al., 1997; De Borger and Fosgerau,
2008).
We now assume the existence of an underlying reference-free hedonic utility func-
tion u(r). It is not required that the individual is aware of his hedonic utility at all
possible consumption bundles, it suffices that ’he has access’ to his marginal utilities
(marginal rates of substitution) at the reference when forming his reference-dependent
preferences. To link reference-dependent choice preferences to the underlying reference-
free hedonic utility function we specify marginal reference-dependent utilities, evalu-
ated at the reference, as follows:
u+i (r|r) = ui(r)µ+i , u−i (r|r) = ui(r)µ−i .
Note that this is just a small elaboration of the specification of the linear reference-
dependent utility in Tversky and Kahneman (1991). There is no loss of generality from
(1). The formulation may also be derived from the definition of reference-dependent
3The survey comprised 2131 car drivers who were asked to choose between two alternative trips defined
in terms of travel cost and time. Choice situations were designed relative to a recent trip subjects had made.
Each subject made choices in 8 such situations: two WTP type choices, two WTA, two EG and two EL.
The econometric model allowed for observed and unobserved heterogeneity and errors, and estimated first a
parameter for the median in the sample of each of the four valuation measures. They were all very significant
and very different. Imposing the restriction given by (2) cost about half a likelihood unit. Fosgerau et al.
(2006) present similar evidence on datasets where subjects were recruited from other modes of transport.
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utility in Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), who are also concerned with the relation between
choice and hedonic utility.
3 Symmetric loss aversion and the identification of reference-
free trade-offs
To introduce the concept of symmetric loss aversion it will be instructive to consider
a particular representation of choice preferences that makes asymmetry highly visible.
Using the notation S(x) = 1 if x > 0 and S(x) = −1 otherwise, it is convenient to
parameterize choice utility as
u(x+ r|r) = u(r) + u1(r)e−η1S(x1)x1 + u2(r)eγ−η2S(x2)x2.
This formulation is equivalent to (1) since we are free to multiply utility by any positive
number. It is easy to see that loss aversion is now equivalent to ηi > 0. The parameter
γ generates asymmetry in reference-dependent utility; in the absence of loss aversion,
γ measures the difference between the marginal rates of substitution of hedonic and
choice preferences. Working out the four valuation measures for this parameterization,
we find:
WTP =
u2(r)
u1(r)
eγ−η1−η2 , WTA =
u2(r)
u1(r)
eγ+η1+η2
EG =
u2(r)
u1(r)
eγ+η1−η2 , EL =
u2(r)
u1(r)
eγ−η1+η2
Suppose we have estimates of the four valuation measures. Under what conditions
do these estimates allow the identification of the trade-off implied by the underlying
reference-free utility function? The answer immediately follows from the above ex-
pressions. Noting thatWTP ·WTA = EG ·EL =
(
u2(r)
u1(r)
)2
e2γ , we need to know γ
in order to identify u2(r)u1(r) from observation of WTP and WTA (or equivalently from
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EG and EL). Loss aversion is symmetric when γ = 0. Hence symmetry allows us
to identify the marginal rate of substitution of the hedonic utility from estimates of the
valuation measures.
What do we learn from this for applied cost-benefit analysis? We know that, if
choice preferences are reference-dependent, a large difference may result between will-
ingness to pay and willingness to accept (and a smaller difference between equivalent
gain and loss). This in itself, however, does not provide any information on which value
is most appropriate in applied cost-benefit analysis. But in this section, we showed that,
if loss aversion is symmetric, the marginal rate of substitution implied by the under-
lying hedonic preferences can be recovered from the geometric mean of the estimates
of WTA and WTP (or, alternatively, EL and EG). Indeed, the expressions just derived
imply that, if γ = 0,
u1(r)
u2(r)
=
√
WTP ·WTA =
√
EL · EG.
4 Rationality arguments for symmetric loss aversion
In this section, we argue that there are good economic reasons for imposing symmetric
loss aversion on Tversky-Kahneman type preferences. The first argument (section 4.1)
builds upon Munro-Sugden and shows that, for arbitrary loss aversion, symmetry guar-
antees that the hedonic optimum is a reflexive optimum. The second argument (section
4.2) is a rationality argument under uncertainty. Specifically, we show that if loss aver-
sion is asymmetric, then a sequence of reference-dependent choice utility maximizing
choices will on average lead to lower hedonic utility than if loss aversion is symmetric.
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4.1 Variable loss aversion, constant asymmetry
In this subsection, we build upon the interpretation of the relation between reference-
dependent and reference-free utility suggested by Munro and Sugden (2003). They
describe a trading process whereby individuals maximize reference-dependent prefer-
ences in a series of trades, each time updating the reference, until no further improve-
ment can be found. They then define the set of endpoints of such a process as the set
of reflexive optima.
Let us develop the implications of this idea for the interpretation of potentially
asymmetric loss aversion. Consider reference-dependent choice utility maximization
under a budget restriction reflecting given prices p and endowment Y. The set of re-
flexive optima then consists of all bundles r such that no small deviation x exists that
maintains the budget (px = 0) and increases choice utility. The set of reflexive optima
is defined by
X∗ = {r : u(x+ r|r) ≤ u(r|r)∀x : px = 0}.
Now reconsider the parametrization of reference-dependent preferences given above.
Take an arbitrary reference point in the set of reflexive optima r ∈ X∗ and let x be
a small budgetary neutral (px = 0) change from r to r + x. First looking at changes
that marginally raise dimension 1 while reducing dimension 2 and then vice versa, it is
easily shown, since r ∈ X∗ and therefore u(x+ r|r) ≤ u(r|r), that
ln
p1
p2
+ γ − η1 − η2 ≤ ln u1(r)
u2(r)
≤ ln p1
p2
+ γ + η1 + η2. (3)
It follows that the reference-free hedonic optimum belongs to the set of reflexive optima
exactly if
−η1 − η2 ≤ γ ≤ η1 + η2, (4)
since the reference-free optimum is characterized by p1p2 =
u1
u2
.
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This has important implications. If the loss aversion parameters are small and
asymmetry is substantial, then the set of reflexive optima excludes the hedonic opti-
mum, and so the reference-dependent trading process will be sure not to converge to
the hedonic optimum. Conversely, if there is a unique reflexive optimum (zero loss
aversion), then symmetry implies that the trading process of sequentially updating the
reference necessarily converges to the hedonic optimum. This finding has economic
relevance, since it has been argued (List, 2004; Plott and Zeiler, 2005) that loss aver-
sion may largely disappear as a result of training and experience. If the ηi are reduced
by training and experience while γ is constant, we must have γ = 0 to guarantee the
hedonic optimum to be a reflexive optimum. Starting from Tversky-Kahneman type
reference-dependent preferences, we may therefore argue that rationality requires that
loss aversion is symmetric.
4.2 Constant loss aversion, constant asymmetry
Despite its appeal, in one respect the above argument is not entirely convincing: there
is no economic reason why asymmetry γ should be fixed as η′s decline, e.g., due to
experience. We therefore consider a broader and more general argument supporting
symmetric loss aversion. We shall show that without symmetry, for fixed degrees of
loss aversion, a process of reference-dependent utility maximization will on average
lead to lower reference-free utility than if loss aversion is symmetric. In this sense,
symmetric loss aversion is rational.
We take a perspective from behind a veil of ignorance: the optimal degree of asym-
metry must be chosen not knowing the situations in which it is to be applied. We
consider the expected hedonic utility given a budget y, random prices p, and a random
hedonic utility function u. The degrees of loss aversion, η1 and η2, are constant. We
consider then what choice of γ maximizes expected utility.
We assume (4) such that the hedonic optimum is always a reflexive optimum. The
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task is then to select γ to maximize
E(u(x)|px = y, x ∈ RO).
In other words, we select γ to maximize expected hedonic utility conditional on being
in a reflexive optimum. We require no knowledge about the hedonic utility function,
nor of income or of prices, except for some regularity conditions. We do however
require that the distribution of preferences and prices, from our point of view behind the
veil, is symmetric in dimensions. We will make this assumption more specific below.
We may say that the assumption embodies a priori ignorance of the circumstances
under which the individual is going to maximize his reference-dependent preferences.
Since it is not known whether the γ is going to be applied on dimension 1 or dimension
2, we may assume that γ = γ+ ≥ 0 and γ = −γ+ are equally likely.
Recall (3) which may be written as
γ − η1 − η2 ≤ ln u1p2
u2p1
≤ γ + η1 + η2 (5)
for any point in the set of reflexive optima. Let φ(t|px = y) = P (ln u1p2u2p1 = t|px = y)
be the density of ln u1p2u2p1 conditional on px = y. Then t is in the interval given by (5).
Make the symmetry assumption that
φ(t|px = y) = φ(−t|px = y).
This assumption embodies ignorance by merely saying that reflexive optima on either
side of the hedonic optimum are equally likely. We further assume that φ is unimodal,
such that tφ′(t|px = y) < 0.4 Define for convenience
g(t) = E
(
u(x)|px = y, ln u1p2
u2p1
= t
)
4Becker (1962) assumes just a uniform distribution in a similar situation.
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and assume that g(t) is symmetric. Again, this assumption merely states ignorance:
the sign of t does not tell us anything about u(x). Without loss of generality we also
assume that g(t) > 0. Then, referring to (5) we may elaborate the expected utility as
E(u(x)|px = y, x ∈ RO) = 1
2
∫ γ++η1+η2
γ+−η1−η2
g(t)φ(t|px = y)dt
+
1
2
∫ −γ++η1+η2
−γ+−η1−η2
g(t)φ(t|px = y)dt
=
∫ γ++η1+η2
γ+−η1−η2
g(t)φ(t|px = y)dt. (6)
Assume finally that both goods are normal goods at all prices. This condition is
equivalent to requiring that ujui uii < uij for i 6= j. The condition is slightly stronger
than strict convexity of the indifference curves, which (in two dimensions) is equivalent
to assuming u2u1u11 − 2u12 + u22 u1u2 < 0. From the assumptions made here, Appendix
A then proves the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With the assumptions above, 0 = argmaxγ+ E (u (x) |px = y, x ∈ RO) .
This means that the expected hedonic utility from maximizing reference-dependent
choice utility in a sequence of trades is maximized only if loss aversion is symmetric.
5 Conclusions
Starting from the observed large differences between different valuation measures (will-
ingness to pay, willingness to accept, equivalent gain, and equivalent loss), we argue
that it is not appropriate to use either of these measures in cost benefit analysis. This
paper then makes two contributions. First, we show that if reference-dependent choice
preferences stand in a particular relation to underlying reference-free hedonic prefer-
ences, then the assumption of symmetric loss aversion allows recovery of the hedonic
marginal rate of substitutions between goods as the geometric average of WTA and
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WTP (or equivalently of EL and EG). We suggest using this value in applied cost-
benefit analysis. Second, as the previous argument requires symmetric loss aversion,
we show that optimizing behavior under reference-dependent choice preferences will
lead to maximal expected hedonic utility under symmetry. In this sense, symmetric
loss aversion is rational.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
This section is devoted to the proof of proposition 1. Differentiate (6) with respect to
γ+ to find the first order condition for a maximum.
dg(t)
dγ+
= g(γ+ + η1 + η2)φ(γ+ + η1 + η2|px = y)− g(γ+ − η1 − η2)φ(γ+ − η1 − η2|px = y)
= 0
The first order condition is satisfied for γ+ = 0. We note that γ+ − η1 − η2 < 0 <
γ+ + η1 + η2 by assumption. Differentiation of the first order condition shows that
second derivative of the expected utility E(u(x)|px = y, x ∈ RO) is always negative,
provided that g′(t) < 0 for t > 0. In this case, the expected utility has a unique
maximum at γ+ = 0. Our task is then reduced to showing that indeed g′(t) < 0 for
t > 0.
The budget constraint, px = y, and the definition of t = ln u1p2u2p1 together identify
a unique x as a function of y, p, t.Write just x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t)) since y, p are given
under the expectation operator. We then consider u(t) = u(x(t)). Differentiating, we
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find
u′ (t) = u1x′1 + u2x
′
2
= u1x′1 −
p1
p2
u2x
′
1
=
√
u1u2
√
p1
p2
et/2x′1 −
√
u1u2
√
p1
p2
e−t/2x′1
=
(
et/2 − e−t/2
)√
u1u2
√
p1
p2
x′1,
where the second equality follows from the budget constraint and the third equality
follows from the definition of t.
The problem is now to find x′1. First differentiate the definition of t to find
u11x
′
1 + u12x
′
2 =
p1
p2
(u12x′1 + u22x
′
2) e
t +
p1
p2
u2e
t.
We can then solve this equation for x′1. Use first the budget constraint to find x
′
2 =
−p1p2x′1, such that
u11x
′
1 − u12
p1
p2
x′1 =
p1
p2
(
u12x
′
1 − u22
p1
p2
x′1
)
et +
p1
p2
u2e
t
p1
p2
u2e
t = x′1
(
u11 − u12 p1
p2
− u12 p1
p2
et + u22
p1
p2
p1
p2
et
)
x′1 =
p1
p2
u2e
t
u11 − u12 p1p2 − u12
p1
p2
et + u22 p1p2
p1
p2
et
x′1 =
u2e
t
p2
p1
u11 − u12 − u12et + u22 p1p2 et
.
Inserting this into the expression for u′ (t) yields
u′ (t) =
(
et/2 − e−t/2
) u1u2
p2
p1
u11e−t/2 − u12e−t/2 − u21et/2 + u22 p1p2 et/2
=
(
et/2 − e−t/2
) u1u2
u2
u1
u11et/2 − u12
(
e−t/2 + et/2
)
+ u22 u1u2 e
−t/2
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This expression is always negative by the assumption on the possible hedonic utility
functions. Hence g′(t) = Eu′(t) < 0 as required. This concludes the proof of propo-
sition 1.
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